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NOTES 
 
Tribal Law and Disorder 
A LOOK AT A SYSTEM OF BROKEN JUSTICE IN 
INDIAN COUNTRY AND THE STEPS NEEDED 
TO FIX IT* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On a typical spring night in 2004, Alex Apichito, a 
young construction worker, and some friends were walking 
home from a party when they ran into Alex’s older cousin, 
Leonard.1 Even though the two had a sometimes turbulent 
relationship, Leonard invited the group back to his house for 
drinks.2 At some point later that night, Alex and Leonard began 
to argue, eventually provoking Leonard to exit the room.3 A few 
minutes later, he reemerged with a combat knife in his hand 
and attacked Alex, slashing his throat from his neck to his ear.4 
Luckily for Alex, he was able to escape without further injury.5 
Soon after arriving home, Alex sought medical attention and 
was quickly airlifted to the nearest hospital, where he would 
spend the next two days recovering.6 Four months later, 
  
 * A version of this Note was previously published as Tribal Law and 
Disorder: A Look at the System of Broken Justice in Indian Country and the Steps 
Needed to Fix It, OKLA. SUP. CT. SOVEREIGNTY SYMP. COMPENDIUM, at XI (June 2009). 
 1 This account is taken from the PBS program, “EXPOSÉ on THE JOURNAL: 
Broken Justice” and an article from the Denver Post, Justice: Inaction’s Fatal Price. See Bill 
Moyer’s Journal: EXPOSÉ on THE JOURNAL: Broken Justice (PBS television broadcast 
Nov. 14, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/ 
11142008/transcript2.html) [hereinafter Broken Justice]; Michael Riley, Justice: Inaction’s 
Fatal Price, DENVER POST, Nov. 12, 2007, at A1. 
 2 Broken Justice, supra note 1; Riley, supra note 1. 
 3 Riley, supra note 1. 
 4 Id.; see also Broken Justice, supra note 1 (“I turned, once he grabbed me, 
and I just felt that cold slice.”). 
 5 Riley, supra note 1. 
 6 See Broken Justice, supra note 1; Riley, supra note 1. 
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Leonard Apachito would stab another young man, Arthur 
Schobey.7 However, this time, Leonard’s victim would not 
survive the attack.8  
One of the main reasons why Leonard Apachito was not 
detained prior to Arthur Schobey’s murder is that both Leonard 
and Alex Apachito are American Indians who live on the 
Navajo reservation.9 While it may seem perplexing that an 
individual’s race would affect the quality of law enforcement 
that individual receives, this race-based system of justice is an 
unpleasant reality for those living on Indian reservations.10 Due 
to antiquated laws that severely limit the tribal governments’ 
ability to maintain criminal justice, Indians rely exclusively on 
the federal government to investigate and prosecute felonies 
committed within tribal lands.11 However, when the federal 
agencies responsible for policing Indian country do not have the 
  
 7 See Broken Justice, supra note 1; Riley, supra note 1. 
 8 See Broken Justice, supra note 1; Riley, supra note 1. 
 9 For crimes committed in Indian country, the race of the offender and race 
of the victim both affect the criminal jurisdiction of a case. See Greg Guedel, Why Are 
Tribal Courts the Last Race-Based Jurisdiction in the United States?, 
http://www.nativelegalupdate.com/2008/12/articles/why-are-tribal-courts-the-last-racebased 
-jurisdiction-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2009); see also Broken Justice, 
supra note 1 (“[A]s Americans, . . . we have a strong expectation of the way our justice 
system ought to function; . . . we live in a society where, if you commit a crime, 
especially a serious crime, people will investigate that crime, people will arrest you and 
people will try and convict you. What happens actually on reservations doesn’t look at 
all like that picture.”); infra Part II. According to the United States Department of 
Justice, an “Indian” is a person who has Indian ancestry and belongs to a federally 
recognized Indian tribe. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, FAQS 
ABOUT NATIVE AMERICANS, http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/nafaqs.htm#otj20 (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2009); see also United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The test . . . 
generally followed by the courts [to determine whether a person is ‘Indian’], considers 
(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.”). 
While the use of the word “Indian” may seem archaic, it is commonly used by all 
government agencies and is generally recognized to refer to both “American Indians” 
and “Native Americans.” See Christina Berry, What’s in a Name? Indians and Political 
Correctness, ALL THINGS CHEROKEE, http://www.allthingscherokee.com/articles_ 
culture_events_070101.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009); see also Peter d’Errico, Native 
American Studies—A Note On Names, http://www.umass.edu/legal/derrico/name.html 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2009). For the purposes of this Note, the term “Indian” refers to 
American Indians, Native Americans, and Alaskan Natives. 
 10 See Guedel, supra note 9 (“In no other area of American jurisprudence is 
race—in this case ‘Indian’ or ‘non-Indian’—a factor in determining whether a court has 
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. Decades ago the Civil Rights Movement helped 
sweep away race-based segregation and ‘Jim Crow’ laws, but seemingly had no impact 
on the use of race as a jurisdictional consideration in the realm of Tribal Courts.”); see 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 203097, A BJS 
STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002: AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (2004) [hereinafter 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/pdf/american_ 
indians_and_crime.pdf. 
 11 See infra Part II. 
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resources to adequately enforce the law, cases are delayed and 
criminals like Leonard Apachito remain free.12  
As a result of this broken system of justice, the 
prevalence of violent crime within Indian communities is 
formidable.13 Indians endure violent crimes at an average rate 
of 101 victims for every 1000 persons, almost two and a half 
times the national rate.14 In addition, while Indians make up 
only 0.5% of the population, they make up 1.3% of all victims of 
violence in the United States.15 Despite these high levels of 
crime, federal prosecutors decline 65% of criminal cases 
referred to them, largely due to problems with tribal 
investigations.16 In areas where the federal government does 
not maintain exclusive jurisdiction over criminal matters 
within Indian country, tribal governments are severely limited 
in their ability to punish offenders.17 
In response to the “staggering” crime rates in Indian 
country, Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota introduced the 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008 (the “Bill”) on July 23, 2008, 
which, among other things, aims to increase law enforcement 
presence on tribal lands, improve communication between the 
various agencies responsible for policing Indian country, and 
  
 12 See infra Part III.B.2. In the case of Alex Apachito, FBI agents did not 
apprehend Leonard Apachito despite receiving witness testimony identifying him as 
the assailant. See Riley, supra note 1. Instead, the FBI arrested the wrong man, and 
subsequently dropped the case, presumably to pursue more serious crimes due to the 
FBI’s overbearing case load in Indian country. See id. (noting the costs of letting 
federal law enforcement ignore lesser crimes on Indian reservations). 
 13 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(12) 
(2008); AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 4. 
 14 See AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 4. Among all races, 
the rate of victimization is 41 per 1000 persons. Id. However, this rate of victimization 
may be deflated when compared to the number of instances of violence which go 
unreported to police. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 176354, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION 
AND RACE, 1993-1998, at 8 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/vvr98.pdf. According to an earlier report form the Department of Justice on the 
relationship between crime and race, American Indians tend to report only 46% of 
cases to the police. Id. at 1. Among the reasons for not reporting these cases, “Police 
will not bother” accounted for 12% of victims declining to report violence, around twice 
the percentage for this reason among other races. Id. at 8. In addition, for the purposes 
of this note, “violent crime” refers to rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, 
and simple assault, based on the abundance of data on these crimes compared to other 
violent crimes. See generally AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 4. 
 15 See AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 4-5. Viewed from a 
different perspective, Indians experience violence at a rate of approximately one victim 
for every ten residents in comparison to the national rate of approximately one victim 
for every twenty-four residents. Id.  
 16 See Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 2007; 
Broken Justice, supra note 1; infra Part III. 
 17 See infra Part II.C. 
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increase prosecutorial accountability.18 While the Bill marks an 
important and necessary step in the fight to lower crime levels 
and amend the current relationship between various law 
enforcement agencies in Indian country, it falls short of 
providing much needed robust infrastructural remedies.  
This Note will argue that, in light of the many 
shortcomings of the current scheme of Indian law, several 
changes need to be made to federal law in order to allow tribal 
governments to take charge of the crime-related problems in 
Indian country. These changes would empower tribes by 
expanding criminal jurisdiction to all offenders in Indian 
country regardless of race, increasing tribal sentencing 
authority, and unifying the tribal and federal law enforcement 
agencies to provide more efficient policing on Indian 
reservations. This Note will also argue that, despite the 
positive suggestions proposed in the Bill, the Tribal Law and 
Order Act does not go far enough to make the necessary 
fundamental changes to Indian law. Part II will examine the 
current scheme of Indian law in the United States in order to 
provide a legal background for the complexities that have led to 
the current criminal problems in Indian country. Part III will 
discuss the difficulties that law enforcement officials and 
prosecutors face as a direct result of the tribal/federal 
dichotomy. Lastly, Part IV will analyze the Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2008, assessing the Bill’s compelling propositions 
and noting its weaknesses. Part IV will also advance several 
suggestions that should be adopted in order to most effectively 
deal with crime in Indian country.  
  
 18 See News Release, Senator Byron L. Dorgan, Dorgan Introduces 
Legislation Aimed at Giving Boost to Law & Order in Indian Country (July 23, 2008), 
available at http://dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=301170. The Tribal Law 
and Order Act was co-sponsored by Senator Baucus (MT), Vice President Biden (former 
Senator, DE), Senator Bingaman (NM), Senator Cantwell (WA), Senator Domenici 
(NM), Senator Johnson (SD), Senator Kyl (AZ), Senator Lieberman (CT), Senator 
Murkowski (AK), Senator Smith (OR), Senator Tester (MT), and Senator Thune (SD). 
Id. Following the end of the 110th Congress’s term, the bill was reintroduced on April 
2, 2009 in the 111th Congress. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009, S. 797, 111th Cong. 
(2009). For the purposes of this Note, all references to the Bill are meant to correspond 
with the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, which aside from minor and mainly 
pagination-based differences, is substantially identical to the Tribal Law and Order Act 
of 2009. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF INDIAN LAW 
A. The Marshall Trilogy; The Federal Trust Responsibility 
In order to best understand the current scheme of 
Indian law,19 it is important to look at how the relationship 
between the federal government and the Indian tribes 
developed.20 A set of cases decided by the Marshall Court, 
commonly dubbed the “Marshall Trilogy,” addressed many 
unanswered questions regarding the status of the Indian tribes 
and ultimately established the legal framework for Indian law 
that persists today.21 In the first of these cases, Johnson v. 
McIntosh, the Marshall Court dealt with the question of 
whether tribes could convey land to private individuals.22 The 
Court held that, while Indians enjoyed occupancy rights to 
their lands, the ultimate title was held by the United States, 
and thus, the tribes had no basis for transferring that title to 
private individuals.23  
  
 19 “Indian Law” primarily refers to the overarching field of law that 
designates “the rights and obligations” of Indians and Indian tribes within the United 
States. GARY A. SOKOLOW, NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 1 (2000). 
Further, Indian Law does not cover all legal disputes involving Indians. WILLIAM C. 
CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 2-3 (5th ed. 2004) (1981). Indian 
Law comes into play only when the end result of a dispute is influenced by the Indian 
status of any of the involved actors. Id. at 1-2. If an Indian were to commit a traffic 
infraction in Brooklyn, the case would not be influenced by the violator’s Indian status 
and would therefore not fall under Indian Law. See id. at 2-3. However, if an Indian 
commits a traffic infraction within an Indian reservation in upstate New York, the case 
would be influenced not only be the violator’s Indian status, but also by the location of 
the infraction, and would therefore fall under the field of Indian Law. See id. 
 20 According to the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs must publish an annual list of federally recognized Indian 
Tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (2006). As of August 11, 2009, the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
recognizes 564 Indian tribes eligible for “funding and services.” See Indian Entities 
Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 153, 40,218, 40,218-23 (Aug. 11, 2009). Federally unrecognized 
tribes meeting common law requirements such as sufficient duration, territoriality, 
organization, and cultural identity have also been successful in securing the same legal 
rights as federally recognized Indian tribes. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 5; see also 
Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, Inc., 68 P.3d 814, 816 
(Mont. 2003). See generally Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing 
Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723 (2008). 
 21 The “Marshall Trilogy” refers to three cases, Johnson & Graham’s Lessee 
v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 
Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), decided under the 
Marshall Court, which dealt with land disputes between early Americans and the 
Indian tribes. See SOKOLOW, supra note 19, at 229; Droske, supra note 20, at 728-29.  
 22 See generally McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. 
 23 See id. at 592 (“The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired 
[by the United States] by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which 
title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”). 
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The second case of the trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,24 shed additional light on the role of Indian tribes 
within the federal regulatory scheme. In Cherokee, the 
Cherokee Nation sued the state of Georgia under Article III, 
Section 2 of the Constitution as a “foreign State[],”25 asking the 
Court to void Georgia legislation “intending to force . . . the 
Indians from their territory.”26 The Court dismissed the case for 
lack of original jurisdiction on the grounds that the Cherokee 
Nation was not a foreign nation, but rather a “domestic 
dependent nation[].”27 Justice Marshall likened the Indians’ 
relation to the United States not to that of two individual 
sovereigns, but instead to that of “a ward to his guardian.”28 In 
the third case of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, the 
Court explicitly exempted Indian tribes from the jurisdiction of 
state laws,29 and, in doing so, established a federal “trust 
responsibility” by the United States over the Indian tribes.30 
  
 24 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 26 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 9. 
 27 See id. at 17. In the Marshall Trilogy, the Supreme Court often described 
the trustee relationship between the Indians and United States with lengthy narrative. 
For example, in Cherokee Nation, the court noted: 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, 
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall 
be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be 
doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged 
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated 
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic 
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title 
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when 
their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. 
Their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian. 
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and 
its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as 
their great father. 
Id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. In Worcester, the Court ruled that a state 
law, requiring the appellant to obtain a license from the governor to live with the 
Cherokee Tribe, was invalid on the basis that Congress had the exclusive power to 
legislate matters of Indian Law. Id. 
 30 CANBY, supra note 19, at 34-39. The federal trust responsibility refers to 
the “special relationship” between the United States and the Indian tribes, by which 
the federal government resembles a trustee to its beneficiary Indians. The 
government’s fiduciary duty covers a broad range of legal obligations established 
throughout the history of the United States. Id.; see also Reid Peyton Chambers, 
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
1213, 1220 (1975) (describing in detail the federal trust responsibility starting from its 
origins in the Marshall Trilogy: “[It] recognizes a sort of ‘protectorate’ status in the 
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The Marshall Trilogy deemed Indian tribes 
independently sovereign and free from state rule, but 
nevertheless subject to the laws of the United States.31 At the 
time, the Marshall Court’s decisions marked victories for 
Indian tribes who were being systematically forced out of their 
land as a young America expanded.32 However, the President 
and Congress largely ignored the ideological underpinnings of 
the Marshall Trilogy during the subsequent Jacksonian era.33 
Instead of yielding to the law established by the Marshall 
Court, the federal government34 and various individual states35 
continued to implement a policy of removal as American 
frontiers claimed new lands to the West.36 The blatant 
disregard for the Marshall Trilogy rulings marked one of the 
earliest examples of the difficulties of enforcing protective 
Indian law in the United States and demonstrated a 
substantial clash between the three branches of government.37 
One of the few sources of refuge from the government’s misuse 
of power was the federal system.38 Indian tribes often cited the 
federal trust responsibility established in the Marshall Trilogy 
as their chief argument in attempting to enjoin public and 
private actors from infringing upon their rights as domestic 
sovereigns.39  
  
tribes, securing to them the power of managing their internal affairs in an autonomous 
manner except for a congressional power to regulate trade. Moreover, tribal autonomy 
is supported by a federal duty to protect the tribe’s land and resource base.”). 
 31 See Droske, supra note 20, at 729 n.29.  
 32 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 18-19. 
 33 While not verifiable, President Jackson is notably quoted in reference to 
the Marshall Trilogy as saying, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him 
enforce it.” Id. 
 34 BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL 
TRADITION 274 (1998). The Indian Removal Act of 1830 was passed by Congress with 
the purpose of removing those Indians who had not assimilated into the American way 
of life to Indian Territory, now Oklahoma. Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 
411 (1830). 
 35 JOHANSEN, supra note 34, at 326-27. In response to the discovery of gold on 
Cherokee land, Georgia passed laws in 1829 prohibiting Indians from surveying its 
land or mining for gold. Id. Despite the surge of thousands of Americans onto Cherokee 
land, Georgia state courts dismissed any suits based on Cherokee testimony as 
incompetent. Id. 
 36 See id. at 326-30. 
 37 See infra Part III; see also supra note 32-33 and accompanying text. 
 38 CANBY, supra note 19, at 40-41. 
 39 See id. at 40-51. For instance, in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, the 
Supreme Court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from selling tribal lands on the 
basis that such an action “would not be an exercise of guardianship, but an act of 
confiscation.” See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919). 
268 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
B.  Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians; Statutory Changes 
Crimes committed within Indian Territory, whether by 
Indians or non-Indians, are subject to an overlapping 
jurisdictional matrix of federal, state, and tribal law created 
largely by statute over the past 200 years.40 The first of these 
statutes, the General Crimes Act of 1817, was passed by 
Congress to establish a legal framework for prosecuting crimes 
committed in Indian country.41 The General Crimes Act 
relinquished the power of the states in prosecuting crimes 
committed on Indian lands, and instead bestowed exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction to the federal government.42 An exception 
to this federal jurisdiction was created for crimes committed by 
Indians against other Indians, which Congress left to be 
governed by tribal law and tried in tribal courts.43 
While the General Crimes Act was pivotal in 
establishing federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian country, 
at this point in history there was not an extensive body of 
federal criminal law from which to prosecute criminals in 
federal lands.44 In addition, while federal criminal statutes 
governing Indians did exist,45 comprehensive criminal codes 
  
 40 See infra Part II.C; see also CANBY, supra note 19, at 200. 
 41 CANBY, supra note 19, at 148; see General Crimes Act of 1817, ch. 92, 3 
Stat. 383 (1817) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)). 
 42 See General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The original General Crimes Act 
established that any person who commits a crime, Indian or non-Indian, within Indian 
Country, shall be subject to the laws of the United States if in its exclusive jurisdiction, 
and shall be tried in the courts of the United States. Id. The current statute reads: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within 
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of 
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the 
person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any 
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the 
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction 
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
Id. 
 43 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 148; see General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
 44 See Droske, supra note 20, at 730-31. 
 45 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 174. In the case of murder, the first federal 
statute came out of the First Congress of the United States in 1790. See Act of Apr. 30, 
1790, ch. 9, § 3, 1 Stat. 112-13 (1790). The statute provided that any person in a place 
“under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, [who] commit[s] the 
crime of wilful murder . . . shall suffer death.” See id. The earliest murder statute 
meant to specifically protect Indians came from the Fourth Congress and similarly 
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were traditionally created by the states and not the federal 
government.46 “In order to fill the . . . gaps [in federal criminal 
law at the time], Congress passed the Assimilative Crimes Act 
in 1825.”47 This Act required that crimes committed in Indian 
country, which were not federally codified, were to be 
prosecuted according to the criminal laws of the state in which 
the crime took place.48 For instance, if an Indian or non-Indian 
commits a traffic-related offense within Indian land and there 
is no federally codified statute prohibiting such an offense, that 
individual may still be prosecuted under the Assimilative 
Crimes Act for violating the laws of the state in which the 
Indian land is located.49 
The next development in an already complex 
jurisdictional scheme occurred in 1883 with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.50 On August 5, 1881, an 
Indian named Crow Dog fatally shot another Indian on the 
Great Sioux Reservation in what is now South Dakota.51 Local 
Indian police arrested Crow Dog and held him in jail in a 
military cell at Fort Niobrara, Nebraska.52 In accordance with 
tribal law, members of the victim’s family met with Crow Dog’s 
family and resolved the matter for “$600 in cash, eight horses, 
and one blanket.”53 The following year, murder charges were 
brought against Crow Dog in the Dakota territorial court under 
  
mandated the capital punishment for those who killed an Indian. Act of May 19, 1796, 
ch. 30, § 6, 1 Stat. 469, 470-71 (1796). 
 46 CANBY, supra note 19, at 174; see also Droske, supra note 20, at 730-31. 
 47 Droske, supra note 20, at 731; see also 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 13(a); see also Droske, supra note 20, at 731. 
 49 Such was the case in United States v. Billadeau, where the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a non-Indian motorist traveling within Indian country was 
subject to the traffic laws of North Dakota via the Assimilative Crimes Act. See United 
States v. Billadeau, 275 F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A BIA officer has a statutory 
duty to arrest a suspect who commits an offense in Indian country in the officer’s 
presence. The General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, creates federal jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country. It incorporates the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, which provides that when conduct 
which would violate state law occurs on federal land, the relevant state law is 
assimilated into federal law unless there is already applicable federal law.” (citation 
omitted)); see also United States v. Ashley, 255 F.3d 907, 909-10 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 50 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557-58 (1883). The Indian named Kan-
gi-shun-ca was commonly known as Crow Dog and is referred to as Crow Dog by the 
Supreme Court in Crow Dog. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 1 (1994). 
 51 Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557; see HARRING, supra note 50, at 1. 
 52 HARRING, supra note 50, at 1. 
 53 Id. 
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the General Crimes Act.54 At trial, Crow Dog was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death under a federal murder 
statute.55 
In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Crow Dog’s 
conviction, finding that under the tribal law exception of the 
General Crimes Act,56 the Dakota Court did not possess 
criminal jurisdiction over a matter involving two Indian 
participants.57 In Justice Matthews’ compassionate, yet 
condescending opinion, the court noted the importance of 
maintaining the tribal way of governing criminal activity 
within Indian country in accordance with the General Crimes 
Act.58 
Crow Dog appeared to stand for the preservation of 
tribal sovereignty as articulated by the Marshall Court.59 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Crow Dog did not fit 
well with congressional Indian policy.60 In order to resolve this 
discrepancy, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885, 
  
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.; Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
 56 See General Crimes Act § 2, 3 Stat. at 383, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006) 
(“[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as to affect any treaty now in force between 
the United States and any Indian nation, or to extend to any offence committed by one 
Indian against another, within any Indian boundary.”).  
 57 See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 569-72. 
 58 The Court noted:  
[This] is a case involving the judgment of a court of special and limited 
jurisdiction, not to be assumed without clear warrant of law. It is a case of 
life and death. It is a case where, against an express exception in the law 
itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is sought to be extended over 
aliens and strangers; over the members of a community separated by race, by 
tradition, by the instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and 
power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and 
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, 
according to rules and penalties of which they could have no previous 
warning; which judges them by a standard made by others and not for them, 
which takes no account of the conditions which should except them from its 
exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it. It tries 
them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of 
their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social 
state of which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the 
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest 
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man’s revenge 
by the maxims of the white man’s morality. 
Id. at 571. 
 59 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text. 
 60 See HARRING, supra note 50, at 3-4 (“[T]he United States was rapidly 
proceeding with a policy of forced [Indian] assimilation, destroying the tribes as 
political units and incorporating individual Indians into the states as small 
farmers . . . .”). 
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which extended federal jurisdiction to seven “major crimes” 
committed in Indian country, regardless of the actor’s or the 
victim’s ethnicity.61 The immediate impact of the Major Crimes 
Act after Crow Dog was a large influx of Indian-criminal cases 
in federal courts.62 Close to one hundred of these cases were 
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, creating the first set of 
unified Indian criminal law.63 In the long-run, however, the 
spirit of Crow Dog was ultimately lost with the passage of the 
Major Crimes Act and subsequent legislation, and the force of 
tribal governments over the next hundred years continued to 
diminish.64  
C. Post-Crow Dog; Additional Legal Complexities 
By the mid-1900s, several problems had arisen due to 
flaws in the federally established legal framework over crimes 
  
 61 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 159-50; Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 
Stat. 362, (1885) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). The 1885 statute read: 
[A]ll Indians, committing against the person or property of another Indian or 
other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny within any 
Territory of the United States, and either within or without an Indian 
reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of such Territory relating to 
said crimes, and shall be tried therefor in the same courts and in the same 
manner and shall be subject to the same penalties as are all other persons 
charged with the commission of said crimes, respectively; and the said courts 
are hereby given jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such Indians 
committing any of the above crimes against the person or property of another 
Indian or other person within the boundaries of any State of the United 
States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be subject to the 
same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same manner, and subject to 
the same penalties as are all other persons committing any of the above 
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id. at 385 (emphasis added). The modern statute, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1153, adds 
eight crimes to the original list, 
kidnapping, maiming . . . incest, . . . assault with a dangerous weapon, 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this 
title), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 
years, felony child abuse or neglect . . . and [theft] under section 661 of this 
title within the Indian country. 
The modern statute also mandates that where any of these crimes are not federally 
defined, they “shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in 
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.” Id. 
 62 See HARRING, supra note 50, at 5. 
 63 Id. 
 64 For an interesting discussion of the effect of the Crow Dog decision on 
modern Indian Law, see HARRING, supra note 50. 
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committed in Indian country.65 The largest problem was the 
apparent “lawlessness” on Indian reservations.66 Both federal 
and tribal law enforcement agencies had the responsibility of 
controlling the overlapping jurisdictional systems.67 However, 
instead of this dual-responsibility resulting in double-coverage 
within Indian country, tribes were left with “a hiatus in law-
enforcement authority.”68  
The federal government’s opinion of the Indian 
“situation” was equally depressing.69 In stark contrast to the 
national prosperity that followed World War II, Indians 
continued to live in sub-standard conditions.70 Congress was not 
pleased with the state of affairs given the amount of money it 
was allocating to Indian programs at the time; in 1951, the 
federal government spent close to $75 million to implement the 
system of Indian-law it had created.71  
As a result, the nation ushered in a period, now known 
as the “Termination Period,” of forced assimilation, and 
attempted to end federal responsibilities in Indian country.72 
This period included commissioned reports on the apparent 
“Indian Problem”73 and the passage of Congressional 
  
 65 Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State 
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1658-59 (1998).  
 66 Id. at 1659. 
 67 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 200-01. 
 68 See S. REP. NO. 83-699, at 5 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2409, 2411-12 (“As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order among the 
Indians in the Indian country has been left largely to the Indian groups themselves. In 
many States, tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function. . . . [This 
gap] could best be remedied by conferring criminal jurisdiction on States indicating an 
ability and willingness to accept such responsibility.”); see also Jiménez & Song, supra 
note 65, at 1659. 
 69 See Jiménez & Song, supra note 65, at 1662-65. 
 70 See id. at 1663 n.200. 
 71 See id. at 1661. In the hearings prior to Public Law 280’s enactment, one 
representative noted that this budget had “expanded tremendously” in comparison to 
the $31 spent on Indian Affairs in 1800. See 99 CONG. REC. 9263 (1953) (statement of 
Rep. Harrison). Using a comparison to the consumer price index of a given year, $31 
from 1800 is approximately the equivalent to $548 in today’s dollars, and $75 million is 
approximately the equivalent to $1.33 billion in today’s dollars. See Measuring Worth, 
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
 72 See Jiménez & Song, supra note 65, at 1662 n.197; see also Laurence M. 
Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870 to 1992, in 
EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 317, 321 (Oren R. Lyons et al. eds., 1992). 
 73 See COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, H.R. DOC. NO. 81-129, at 63 (1949); see also Jiménez & Song, supra note 65, 
at 1663. 
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resolutions74 aimed at codifying the Termination Period’s 
purposes.75 The most significant of these government actions 
was Public Law 280, enacted in 1953, which “delegated 
criminal jurisdiction” in Indian country to five states: 
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin.76  
The effect of Public Law 280 was that the five states 
would now have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in Indian country, regardless of the race of the actor 
or the victim.77 Not surprisingly, state and tribal governments 
took offense to the new legislation.78 States were now tasked 
with ruling over territory that was previously the exclusive 
province of the federal government.79 These states were not 
provided any additional funds from the federal government or 
the ability to tax Indian lands.80 Likewise, tribes were now 
subject to a body of criminal law that they neither consented to 
nor were familiar with.81  
  
 74 H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (“Whereas it is the policy of Congress, 
as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United 
States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities 
as are applicable to other citizens of the United States . . . . [I]t is declared to be the 
sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes . . . should 
be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations 
specially applicable to Indians . . . .”).  
 75 See Jiménez & Song, supra note 65, at 1663. 
 76 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). When Alaska became a state, 
it was added to the list of “mandatory” states under Public Law 280, bringing the total 
to six states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360. The act also expanded civil jurisdiction, however, for 
the purposes of this Note, this expansion will not be discussed. In addition, some 
exceptions were made to territories within the states. See CANBY, supra note 19, at 
258-63; Droske, supra note 21, at 734. Public Law 280 now reads: 
(a) [Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin] shall 
have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas 
of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent 
that such State has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the 
State or Territory, and the criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have 
the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere 
within the State or Territory . . .  
(c) The provisions of sections 1152 and 1153 of this chapter shall not be 
applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of this 
section . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1162. 
 77 See Droske, supra note 21, at 734-37. 
 78 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 259. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
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As a result of the complete dissolution of tribal 
sovereignty82 and the elimination of the federal government’s 
“guardianship” over the tribes,83 Public Law 280 faced heavy 
criticism.84 Even as it was being signed into law, President 
Eisenhower articulated “grave doubts as to the wisdom of 
certain provisions,”85 specifically a lack of tribal consent to the 
transfer of criminal jurisdiction.86 The passage of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 eventually addressed these concerns by 
inserting a tribal consent requirement before any new states 
could assume criminal jurisdiction in Indian country.87  
In addition to the consent amendment, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act also incorporated many of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights into tribal law.88 However, while this Act was likely 
intended to improve the lives of Indians by limiting the 
potential for abuse by tribal governments, it ultimately took 
away one of the most important pieces of tribal sovereignty 
  
 82 Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee 
nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the 
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, 
vested in the government of the United States.”). 
 83 Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 84 See Droske, supra note 21, at 734. 
 85 See Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Relating to State 
Jurisdiction over Cases Arising on Indian Reservations, 166 PUB. PAPERS 564, 564 
(Aug. 15, 1953). 
 86 See Droske, supra note 21, at 734-35; Jiménez & Song, supra note 65, at 
1657-58; see also Statement, supra note 85, at 565 (“The failure to include in these 
provisions a requirement of full consultation in order to ascertain the wishes and 
desires of the Indians and of final Federal approval, was unfortunate.”). 
 87 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006)). By 1968, nine other states had 
assumed criminal jurisdiction in some form over Indian territory: 
The nine states were Nevada in 1955, South Dakota in 1957 (jurisdiction over 
highways), Washington in 1957 (jurisdiction in eight subject areas), Florida 
in 1961, Idaho in 1963 (civil and criminal jurisdiction over seven subject 
matters, which can be expanded with tribal consent), Montana in 1963 
(jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation), North Dakota in 1963 (assuming 
civil jurisdiction, by tribal consent), Arizona in 1967 (jurisdiction over water 
quality, repealed in 2003, and jurisdiction over air quality, repealed in 1986), 
and Iowa in 1967 (civil jurisdiction over the Sac and Fox Tribe). After the 
1968 Amendment, in 1971, Utah became the last state to accept Public Law 
280 jurisdiction. 
Droske, supra note 21, at 735 n.69 (citations omitted). 
 88 25 U.S.C. § 1302. The Indian Civil Rights act in theory grants rights to 
Indians by prohibiting their ability to “exercis[e] powers of self-government.” For 
instance, “[n]o Indian tribe . . . shall . . . subject any person for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy.” Id. 
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that Indians still retained: the ability to punish native 
criminals according to tribal law.89 Under the Act, Indians were 
given the “right” against “cruel and unusual punishments” by 
preventing tribal courts from imprisoning convicted criminals 
for more than one year or imposing fines over $5000.90 This 
effectively limited tribal governments’ criminal jurisdiction to 
misdemeanors, leaving all felonies in the hands of either the 
states or the federal government.91  
As for the remaining power that Indian tribes 
maintained over criminal matters, the Supreme Court severely 
diminished the already limited scope of tribal authority in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, holding that tribal 
governments do not possess inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians.92 In Oliphant, a tribal police officer from the 
Suquamish Indian Tribe arrested non-Indian Mark David 
Oliphant for assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest 
during an annual tribal celebration.93 After Oliphant twice 
unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief, the Supreme Court 
found that affording Indian tribes the right to try non-Indians 
in tribal courts would be inconsistent with the Indian tribes’ 
role as “domestic dependent nations,” and reversed the lower 
courts’ decision upholding the arrest.94 This “unspoken 
  
 89 Prior to the enactment of the Indians Civil Rights Act of 1968, and under 
the power of the General Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act, Indians had the ability to 
prosecute criminals for non-“major” crimes according to tribal law. See generally supra 
Part II.B. 
 90 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . . (7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and 
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any 
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine of 
$5,000, or both.”). 
 91 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280, ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588 (1953) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). Whether 
the state or the federal government dealt with felonious crimes depends on whether the 
state practices Public Law 280 criminal jurisdiction. 
 92 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). This 
limitation in jurisdiction applied even to those non-Indians living within Indian 
Country. Id. 
 93 Id. at 194-95. After being arraigned and charged under Tribal Code, 
Oliphant applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District of Washington, 
which was denied. He appealed this denial in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but 
the denial was upheld. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
tribal courts had inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and the tribal court 
proceedings were halted, pending the Court’s decision. See id. At the time of the case, 
the Suquamish Tribe was not alone in asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
through its Tribal Code of Law. 33 out of 127 Indian tribes claimed to extend criminal 
jurisdiction to non-Indians and twelve others had enacted ordinances that established 
the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See id. at 196. 
 94 See id. at 210-12. 
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presumption” against criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
was strongly based on the federal common law principles 
established in the Marshall Trilogy, and not on prior treaties or 
statutes.95 Nevertheless, the Court noted that, in light of the 
prevalence of crime on Indian reservations, Congress retained 
the power to grant Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians.96 Oliphant effectively eliminated the Indians’ ability to 
protect themselves from crimes committed by non-Indians, 
thus reaffirming the United States’ role as “guardian” over the 
Indian tribes.97  
With the enactment of Public Law 280 in 1953 and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant, the scheme of criminal 
jurisdiction within Indian country is substantially up-to-date.98 
To summarize, the following chart sets forth who has criminal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed within Indian territory based 
on offender, victim, and crime: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 95 See id. at 203-12 (“By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the 
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian 
citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”). 
 96 See id. at 212. At the end of Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, he noted 
that some Indian court systems had become “increasingly sophisticated.” In addition, 
Rehnquist acknowledged that the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
extended to both Indians and non-Indians being tried in Tribal Court. These advances 
to the tribal justice system have, according to Rehnquist, eliminated many of the 
perceived dangers inherent with Indian tribes exercising criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Id. Thus, Rehnquist’s acquiescence demonstrates the Court’s deference to 
the legislature on the question of whether tribal authorities may possess criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
 97 Id. at 209-12. Justice Marshall, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, 
dissented, noting the lack of any treaty or statute limiting the Indian’s criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 212; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 
(1990) (restating that in criminal matters, tribal sovereignty extends to other tribal 
members and not to “outsiders.”); United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 825 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (“Congress has the power to expand and contract the 
inherent sovereignty that Indian tribes possess because it has legislative authority 
over federal common law.”). See generally supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. 
 98 See generally CANBY, supra note 19, at 200. 
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Offender Victim Crime Criminal 
Jurisdiction*
Substantive 
Law* 
Statutory 
Authority 
“Major” 
crime 
Federal and 
Tribal 
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Federal and 
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Major 
Crimes Act 
Indian 
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“Major” 
crime 
Tribal Tribal  
“Major” 
crime 
Federal and 
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Major 
Crimes Act 
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Federal and 
Tribal 
(concurrent 
jurisdiction) 
State# General 
Crimes Act 
Indian Any crime Federal Federal General 
Crimes Act 
Non-
Indian 
Non-
Indian 
Any crime
 
State State  
* This chart assumes that the crime is not committed within a Public Law 
280 state. 
** While Tribal courts may technically have jurisdiction over these matters, 
they cannot imprison convicted offenders for more than one year or fine them 
more than $5000, largely rendering these courts’ jurisdiction obsolete in cases 
of “Major” crimes.99 
+ Burglary and incest have not been federally codified by criminal statute 
and thus are governed by state substantive law via the Assimilative Crimes 
Act.100 
# Non-“Major” crimes are largely misdemeanors. Thus, where these crimes 
are not federally defined, they are governed by state substantive law via the 
Assimilative Crimes Act.101 
  
 99 See 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006); Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 
1995) (“That the tribes retain jurisdiction over crimes within the Major Crimes Act is 
the conclusion already reached by distinguished authorities on the subject.”); CANBY, 
supra note 19, at 190 (“Even before the passage of the [Indian] Civil Rights Act, most 
tribes had left major crimes other than larceny entirely to the federal government; with 
the Act’s sentencing limit they have little incentive to change that pattern. Here as 
elsewhere tribes may choose to exercise less than their maximum jurisdiction.”). 
 100 See Droske, supra note 21, at 738-39. 
 101 Id. 
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III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS UNDER MODERN INDIAN 
CRIMINAL LAW 
A. The Arrest and Investigation 
Since 1824, the “primary instrument” for implementing 
the federal government’s fiduciary obligations to the Indian 
tribes has been the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), located 
within the United States Department of Interior.102 In 
accordance with the tenets of the federal trust responsibility 
established in the Marshall Trilogy,103 the Bureau’s current 
mission is to “enhance the quality of life, to promote economic 
opportunity, and to carry out the responsibility to protect and 
improve the trust assets of American Indians, Indian tribes, 
and Alaska Natives.”104 
In terms of criminal jurisdiction, the BIA operates a law 
enforcement division in accordance with the Indian Law 
Enforcement Reform Act of 1990.105 Under this Act, the BIA is 
responsible for policing Indian country according to federal law, 
and, with an Indian tribe’s consent, tribal law as well.106 
However, the arrest and investigative duties of the BIA are not 
exclusive.107 Tribal, state, and other federal agencies play 
different roles in policing Indian country depending on a 
number of circumstances.108 
1. Tribal Authority 
Despite the limits imposed on tribes in ruling over non-
Indians,109 Indian tribes have gained general police powers over 
both Indians and non-Indians in several ways.110 In 1975, 
  
 102 See CANBY, supra note 19, at 52. 
 103 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 104 About Us, Bureau of Indian Affairs, http://www.doi.gov/bia/about_us.html 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2009); see also LAURENCE ARMAND FRENCH, NATIVE AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 182-87 (2003). 
 105 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801(8), 2802(b) (2006). The agency is called the “Division 
of Law Enforcement Services.” Id. § 2801(b). 
 106 Id. § 2803(4). 
 107 Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 709, 718-20 (2006). 
 108 See STEWART WAKELING ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON 
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2001) at 5-11, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/188095.pdf. 
 109 See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 110 See Wakeling, supra note 108, at 7-8; see also AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF 
INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
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Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, also known as Public Law 93-638, which 
provided tribes with the opportunity to administer federal 
programs by making arrangements with the BIA.111 Under this 
Act, Indian tribes have contracted with the BIA to establish 
tribal police departments maintaining the “organizational 
framework and performance standards” of the Bureau’s 
Division of Law Enforcement Services.112 These federally funded 
“638 contracts” are administered by tribal governments and 
employ tribal officers.113 According to the U.S. Department of 
the Interior, this type of law enforcement arrangement is the 
most common form of police presence within Indian country.114 
A second way that Indian tribes have gained arrest and 
investigative powers is through “self-governance compacts” 
with the BIA.115 Unlike “638 contracts,” “self-governance 
  
THE USA 4 (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/Jurisdiction-
Focussheet.pdf. 
 111 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 93-638, § 2, 83 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006)); 
WAKELING, supra note 108, at 7; Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring 
Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic 
Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 210 (2008); see also CANBY, supra note 19, at 32. 
 112 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 7. These types of arrangements, under 
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act are known as “638 
contracts.” See Washburn, supra note 107, at 719-20. Several agencies offer programs 
to acquaint tribal police officers with federal law enforcement standards. These 
programs are described by Lawrence Armand French, a Psychology Professor and 
Chair of the Department of Social Sciences at Western New Mexico University, in his 
book, NATIVE AMERICAN JUSTICE:  
The Indian Police Academy offers a fourteen-week Basic Police Training 
Program as well as four weeks of Basic Detention Training; one week of Basic 
Radio Dispatcher Training; ten weeks of Basic Criminal Investigator 
Training; one week of Criminal Investigation and Police Officer In-service 
Training; one week of Chiefs of Police In-service Training as well as Outreach 
Training (Indian country criminal jurisdiction; community policing, gangs, 
and domestic violence; use of force; patrol tactics and procedures; 
investigative techniques; and range officer safety and survival); and multiple 
advanced training programs. A twelve-week training program at the FBI 
National Academy is also available, as is one week of training at the Law 
Enforcement Executive Command College. The U.S. Attorney’s Office and the 
Office of Victims of Crime (OVC) also provide five one-week Regional 
Training Conferences yearly. Graduation data indicate that 33 percent of the 
officers trained at the IPA come from the Great Plains; 31 percent from the 
Southwest; 20 percent from the Northeast; 7 percent from Oklahoma tribes; 
and 6 percent from the southeastern tribes. 
FRENCH, supra note 104, at 133. 
 113 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 7. Funding for “638 contracts” often 
includes a tribal contribution. Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 8; see Washburn, supra note 107, at 719-20. 
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compacts” are based on several amendments to the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975116 and 
provide a much broader degree of Indian control over an 
adopted federal program such as federal law enforcement.117 
Tribal police departments operating under “self-governance 
compacts” receive block grant financing as opposed to itemized 
budgets, allowing them to disperse funds efficiently and 
operate independently.118 
A third method by which tribal police are able to 
participate in law enforcement within Indian country is by 
grant or agreement with states that have criminal jurisdiction 
under Public Law 280.119 However, unlike “638 contracts” or 
“self-governance compacts,” tribal/state agreements vary 
greatly in scope and force, and are not governed by a single 
statutory body.120 
Lastly, some tribal police departments are wholly 
funded and operated by Indian tribes, without state or federal 
  
 116 These amendments include the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285, the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-644, 104 Stat. 4662, the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 
108 Stat. 4250, the Indian Self-Determination Contract Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, and the Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711.  
 117 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 8.  
 118 Under section 403 of the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, funding 
agreements:  
[A]uthorize the tribe to plan, conduct, consolidate, and administer programs, 
services, functions, and activities, or portions thereof, administered by the 
Department of the Interior through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, without 
regard to the agency or office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs within which 
the program, service, function, and activity, or portion thereof, is performed, 
including funding for agency, area, and central office functions in accordance 
with subsection (g)(3) of this section, and including any program, service, 
function, and activity, or portion thereof, administered under the authority 
of… 
25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(1) (2006). See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 8. 
 119 See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/ women/maze/Jurisdiction-Focussheet.pdf. 
 120 Id. at 4 n.10 (“Depending on the particular state, tribal police may have 
full arrest authority over non-Indian individuals. For example, the State of Arizona 
recognizes tribal police and has through legislation commissioned them with State 
Peace Officer authority once a tribal police officer completes a State Police Academy. At 
the other end of the spectrum the State of California does not recognize tribal police 
officers at all. Throughout the USA tribal police authority to make arrests of non-
Indian perpetrators often depends on the whim of a county sheriff and or other 
delegating authority.”). 
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assistance.121 However, due to restraints in criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians and the limited resources in Indian country, 
tribally funded departments remain the least common and 
least robust form of law enforcement within tribal lands.122  
2.  State Authority 
Under Public Law 280, a number of states exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian tribes located within the 
states’ borders.123 As a result, a large number of tribes depend 
on state and local authorities for their law enforcement needs.124 
These departments are funded by state and local taxes and are 
usually subsidized by the state’s non-Indian community.125 
While Public Law 280 states often provide services in areas 
where tribal policing is difficult due to limited tribal resources, 
critics believe that the tribal governments themselves should 
choose the method of law enforcement that serves them best.126 
In addition, state law enforcement often fails to meet the 
demands of the tribes, resulting in overwhelming 
dissatisfaction with state policing under Public Law 280.127 
3. Federal Authority 
Along with the BIA’s Division of Law Enforcement 
Services, the other major federal agency responsible for 
enforcing and investigating criminal law within Indian country 
  
 121 WAKELING, supra note 108, at 8. 
 122 Id. at 7-8. 
 123 See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); see also supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
 124 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 8. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id.  
 127 See Ada Pecos Melton & Jerry Gardner, Public Law 280: Issues and 
Concerns for Victims of Crime in Indian Country (2004), http://www.aidainc.net/ 
Publications/pl280.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); see also CAROLE GOLDBERG-
AMBROSE & TIMOTHY CARR SEWARD, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND 
PUBLIC LAW 280, at 12 (1997) (noting the dissatisfaction that tribes have with Public 
Law 280 states’ policing powers in tribal lands and the two main sources of Indians’ 
frustrations: “First, jurisdictional vacuums or gaps have been created, often 
precipitating the use of self-help remedies that border on or erupt into violence. 
Sometimes these gaps exist because no government has authority. Sometimes they 
arise because the government(s) that may have authority in theory have no 
institutional support or incentive for the exercise of that authority. I will call this kind 
of lawlessness the ‘legal vacuum’ type. Second, where state law enforcement does 
intervene, gross abuses of authority are not uncommon. In other words, power is 
uncabined by the law that it is supposed to constrain it. I will call this kind of 
lawlessness the ‘abuse of authority’ type.”). 
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is the FBI.128 Under a “Memorandum of Understanding” 
between the Department of Justice and the Department of the 
Interior, the FBI and BIA share investigative jurisdiction 
according to guidelines set out in the United States Attorney’s 
Manual.129 A major difference between the FBI and BIA is in 
the BIA’s preference for utilizing tribal policing through “638 
contracts” and “self-governance compacts.”130 These contracts 
are exclusively the province of the BIA.131 Hence, because tribes 
are not permitted to exercise criminal jurisdiction over felonies, 
the BIA (including contracted tribal police departments) has 
largely taken the role of investigating misdemeanors, while the 
FBI generally handles more serious offenses such as felonies 
under the Major Crimes Act.132  
  
 128 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 718-19. 
 129 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL § 9-20.220 
(1997) [hereinafter ATTORNEY MANUAL] (“In 1993, the Department of Justice and the 
Department of the Interior entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that 
established guidelines regarding the respective jurisdictions of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See the Criminal Resource 
Manual at 675. Part IV of the MOU requires each United States Attorney whose 
criminal jurisdiction includes Indian country to develop local written guidelines 
outlining the responsibilities of the BIA, FBI, and the Tribal Criminal Investigators, if 
applicable. See the Criminal Resource Manual at 676, for the full text of MOU.”).  
 130 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 719-20. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.; see also ATTORNEY MANUAL, supra note 129, § 9-675 (“The FBI has 
investigative jurisdiction over violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 as well as most 
other crimes in the Indian country. Frequently, by the time the FBI arrives on the 
reservation, some investigation will have been undertaken by tribal or Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) police. It is recognized that the ability of the tribal and BIA police 
can vary from reservation to reservation, and United States Attorneys are free to ask 
for FBI investigation in all cases where it is felt that this is required. However, United 
States Attorneys are encouraged and authorized to accept investigative reports directly 
from tribal or BIA police and prepare a case for prosecution without FBI investigation 
in all cases where it is felt a sufficient investigation can be undertaken by BIA or tribal 
law enforcement officers. The Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act (ILERA), Pub. L. 
101-379, August 18, 1990, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809, established within the 
BIA of the Department of the Interior, a Division of Law Enforcement Services (DLES) 
to carry out the Secretary’s responsibility to provide and assist in the provision of law 
enforcement services in Indian country. The ILERA directed the Secretary to establish 
a Branch of Criminal Investigations within the DLES with responsibility for the 
investigation and presentation for prosecution of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 
1153, under agreement with the Department of Justice, and subject to guidelines to be 
adopted by the United States Attorneys. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has 
been signed by the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior. United States 
Attorneys are free to assign investigative responsibilities in accordance with guidelines 
previously issued, or which they now care to issue. The ILERA also authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior, after consultation with the Attorney General, to promulgate 
regulations relating to the exercise of this law enforcement authority and relating to 
the consideration of applications for law enforcement contracts under the Indian Self 
Determination Act, P.L. 93-638, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq.”). 
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For example, under the current scheme, if a non-Indian 
male were to commit an act of sexual violence against an 
Indian female, the matter would be exclusively federal per the 
Major Crimes Act.133 As a result, the FBI would likely 
commence an investigation, assuming tribal, state, or federal 
authorities had not already apprehended the perpetrator.134 
However, unlike most cases in which the FBI holds 
jurisdiction, crimes committed in Indian country are unique in 
several ways, making them problematic to deal with.135  
Most investigations of criminal activity in Indian 
country are commenced after a particular crime has occurred.136 
While this may seem relatively common for state law 
enforcement, the FBI specializes in prolonged investigations of 
criminal enterprises as opposed to quick responses to 
individual crimes.137 Additionally, investigations within Indian 
country usually do not command the specialized training that 
FBI agents receive.138  
Crimes committed within Indian country are also 
considered relatively minor in comparison to the class of 
criminal matters with which the FBI is familiar.139 The FBI 
concentrates on “terrorism prevention,” “organized crime,” drug 
trafficking, and “counterintelligence.”140 Thus, while a “major 
  
 133 See N. Bruce Duthu, Op-Ed, Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2008, at A17 (author is a professor of Native American studies at Dartmouth 
and published author on Indian law). See generally supra Parts II.B-C.  
 134 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 718. American Indians, Crime, and the 
Law is a Michigan Law Review article written by Kevin K. Washburn, an associate 
professor at the University of Minnesota Law School and former federal prosecutor in 
an Indian country district. Much of the information described in his section on federal 
investigations and prosecutions is taken from his own experience in combination with a 
long list of “former and current Indian country federal prosecutors,” “federal public 
defenders,” and “FBI agents.” Id. While Washburn admits his own subjectivity based 
on his personal experience, he also stresses the numerous sources from which he has 
gathered his information. All in all, Washburn’s account offers a uniquely personal look 
into the world of federal law enforcement within Indian country. Id. at 718 n.30. 
 135 Id. at 718. 
 136 Id. These investigations are referred to as “reactive,” meaning in response 
to a singular event such as a rape or murder. This is in contrast to the bulk of the FBI’s 
investigative work on “proactive” cases, in which an ongoing investigation leads to 
arrests prior to a particular crime. Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. The FBI is well-known for its “sophisticated law enforcement tools” 
used in investigating criminal activity. These tools include using “wiretaps, . . . 
[executing] trap and trace or pen register subpoenas on phone companies, or . . . 
[working] with informants who have infiltrated a criminal organization.” Id. The 
relative simplicity of the criminal cases committed in Indian country do not require the 
use of these investigative tools. Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
284 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1 
crime” committed in Indian country may have a significant 
local impact, it carries little relative weight in the eyes of the 
Bureau and is not typically the province of federal law 
enforcement agencies such as the FBI.141  
FBI agents may also feel overworked and under-
motivated due to the unique circumstances presented by 
investigating crimes within Indian country.142 Not only do 
agents deal largely with cases that are repetitive and relatively 
simple in character, but also often work alone in “rural 
settings,” requiring large driving commitments.143 Further, 
federal agents endure unusually high caseloads due to the high 
crime rates in Indian country.144 The combination of these 
circumstances has inevitably lessened the desirability of 
working in the Indian Law division of the FBI.145 
B. The Prosecution 
In contrast to the diverse bodies of law enforcement that 
police Indian country, the “single most important” prosecutor is 
  
 141 Id. Washburn notes the irony in semantics of the term “Major Crimes” 
from a federal law enforcement perspective: 
[T]hough the offenses are “major” and often tremendously important in the 
communities where these crimes occur, almost all of the crimes are routine, 
local and simple cases involving violent crimes that, in another context, 
would be characterized as “common street crimes” and that would not be 
investigated by federal officials but for the Indian country nexus. . . . As a 
result, the moniker “major” is somewhat misleading as an expression of FBI 
interest and prioritization. 
Id. 
 142 Id. at 718-19. 
 143 Id. (noting that agents “may travel hundreds of miles of reservation roads 
in the course of a week’s work”). To address this and the other problems of the FBI in 
governing criminal law within Indian country mentioned, the FBI developed the “Safe 
Trails Task Force” in 1994 to promote collaboration between various government 
agencies on the federal, state, and tribal level. See FBI, Safe Trails Task Force, 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/indian/safetrails.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).  
 144 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 719 n.33; Remarks Prepared for Delivery 
by Grant D. Ashley, http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/ashley102804.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009) (“Over 100 Special Agents are currently working full-time in 
support of Indian Country investigative matters. In 2004, those agents initiated nearly 
1,900 cases.”). 
 145 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 719 (“Because Indian country tends not 
to be a prestigious posting, the agents in the RAs are often rookies or ‘first office 
agents’ who seek transfer as soon as they are eligible, leading to sometimes high 
turnover among the FBI personnel dealing with Indian country offenses.”). In addition, 
“[a]ccording to federal law enforcement lore, Indian country RAs once served a punitive 
role as places to exile FBI agents that fouled up important cases or were otherwise the 
subject of disfavor within the Bureau.” Id. at 719 n.36. 
2009] TRIBAL LAW AND DISORDER 285 
the United States Attorney.146 In order to evaluate the 
consequences of having a sole federal entity responsible for 
prosecuting crimes within Indian country, it is important to 
examine the balance between the tremendous power that 
federal prosecutors have over the administration of criminal 
justice,147 and the lack of accountability that they have for their 
decisions.148 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion 
When it comes to prosecutorial accountability for an 
unwarranted indictment, the reviewing power of a grand jury 
is constitutionally protected.149 A declination to prosecute, on 
the other hand, is “entirely unreviewable.”150 Nevertheless, 
  
 146 See id. at 725; AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at vii (“The 
U.S. attorney’s office is the principal prosecutor of criminal cases for violation of 
Federal laws in Indian country.”). The United States Attorney acts as the “sole” 
prosecutor in non-Public Law 280 states for major crimes committed by Indians against 
Indians, and all crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian 
country. While tribal courts also play a role in prosecuting minor crimes committed by 
Indians against other Indians and state attorneys prosecute state offenses in Public 
Law 280 states, for the purposes of this note, it is unnecessary to discuss the role of 
tribal and state prosecutors within Indian country. See generally supra Part II. 
 147 An argument can be made that the prosecutor has a larger influence on the 
administration of criminal justice than that of a judge or jury. See Washburn, supra 
note 107, at 725 n.59 (noting that since ninety-one percent of adjudicated felons plea 
bargain and judges follow mandatory minimum sentence guidelines, the discretion of a 
prosecutor in deciding what charge to bring leaves very little flexibility in the hands of 
the judge or potential jury).  
 148 In Wayte v. United States, the Court described the unchecked powers of 
federal prosecutors: 
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains “broad discretion” as 
to whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11, 102 
S. Ct. 2485, 2492, n. 11, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); accord, Marshall v. Jerrico, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1616, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). “[S]o 
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally 
rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 
S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on 
the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to 
judicial review. 
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 
 149 Under the Fifth Amendment, “No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury.” U.S. CONST. art. V. A criminal defendant does, however, have the option to 
waive this indictment and move forward by means of an information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
7(b); see also Washburn, supra note 107, at 722-24. 
 150 Washburn, supra note 107, at 726. 
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before a declination is made, prosecutors are guided by the 
standards of the United States Attorney’s Manual.151 
Under section 9-27.220 of the United States Attorney’s 
Manual, prosecutors are to seek an indictment if a potential 
offender’s “conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the 
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and 
sustain a conviction.”152 Further, a United States Attorney may 
decline to prosecute a federal offense if it is against a federal 
interest, the alleged offender would be more appropriately tried 
in a different jurisdiction, or there is an alternative non-
criminal means to resolve the case.153 Despite these guidelines, 
the federal prosecutor still has “tremendous latitude” in 
deciding whether to pursue an indictment.154 United States 
Attorneys independently and subjectively weigh numerous 
factors such as the federal priority of enforcing a given crime, 
the type and gravity of the crime, and the likely sentence upon 
conviction, without any form of mandated review.155 This broad 
range of discretion presents problems when a federal 
prosecutor does not act in accordance with the values of a given 
tribal community.156  
In order to best prosecute a crime committed within 
Indian country, a United States Attorney needs both local 
knowledge of the Indian communities and their values, and the 
trust of the people whom the prosecutor protects.157 This 
knowledge and trust is difficult to obtain if a federal prosecutor 
is detached from the community she represents.158 Indian 
communities are typically closed and suspicious of outsiders, 
  
 151 ATTORNEY MANUAL, supra note 129, §§ 9-27.001, 9-27.110. 
 152 Id. § 9-27.220 (A).  
 153 Id. § 9-27.220 (A)(1)-(3). These three reasons to decline a prosecution are 
discussed, by subject, in detail within the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual at § 9-27.230, § 9-
27.240 , and § 9-27.250. 
 154 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 727. 
 155 See id. Washburn also notes that “[s]uch decisions are notoriously difficult 
to second-guess, and no other institutional actor has constitutional standing to do so.” 
Id.  
 156 Id. at 729-30. Under the regime of criminal jurisdiction within Indian 
country, federal prosecutors have the duty to “represent—and protect—the Indian 
country community.” Id. at 729. Further, unlike when a federal prosecutor brings 
charges in the interest of the United States at large, where Indian country is involved, 
the federal trust responsibility mandates that actions be taken with the Indian tribe’s 
best interest in mind. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text; cf. Bruce A. Green 
& Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 866 (“At its root, 
the emphasis on objectivity stems from the notion that the prosecutor’s client is the 
public, not any individual constituent whose interests the prosecution might affect.”). 
 157 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 729-33. 
 158 See id. 
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and federal prosecutors often do not speak the native language 
and live several hundred miles from tribal villages.159 This 
detachment may impair the ability of United States Attorneys 
to perform tasks essential to successful prosecutions, such as 
deposing key Indian witnesses, conducting additional 
investigations, or deciding whether to commence or decline a 
prosecution based on community prerogative.160 Further, this 
detachment may also discourage Indian victims from coming 
forward with criminal charges altogether.161 
A prosecutor’s detachment from her respective tribes is 
additionally frustrating to Indians due to the lack of 
accountability over a United States Attorney’s actions.162 Unlike 
many state prosecutors, United States Attorneys are appointed 
by the President, and are thus free from political pressure to 
act in accordance with the community’s will.163 Moreover, when 
a United States Attorney decides to decline a prosecution, that 
prosecutor, while authorized, is not required to submit reports 
to the tribes stating the reasons for the declination.164  
  
 159 Id. at 729-30. 
 160 Id. at 732-33; see also Christopher Chaney, Victim Rights in Indian 
Country-An Assistant United States Attorney Perspective, 51 U.S. ATTY’S BULL. 36, 38-
39 (2003), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/Chaney.pdf. These 
difficulties are highlighted by the risks of being unfamiliar with a tribe’s culture, which 
may lead to offending a victim or potential key witness:  
In most American cultures, looking someone in the eye is a sign of confidence, 
sincerity, and honesty. However, among traditional Navajo people, looking 
someone in the eye is considered to be offensive, an affront, even a challenge 
to the other person. . . . An AUSA can unwittingly damage a prosecution by 
innocently offending a victim or witness. . . . [I]t is . . . important to know 
your witness so that you can tailor your approach to their beliefs, needs, and 
practices. By showing respect to native people and their unique sensibilities, 
an AUSA may be able to gain, not lose, and important witness. 
Id. 
 161 See Ralph Blumenthal, For Indian Victims of Sexual Assault, a Tangled 
Path, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2007 (noting that since women cannot seek the help of 
tribal courts, they often feel discouraged from approaching outside prosecutors). Jami 
Rozell, a “Cherokee woman charging rape by a non-Indian,” describes her preliminary 
hearing in front of a district attorney in Oklahoma as “the hardest thing I’ve ever 
done.” In addition, this discouragement is intensified by a cultural stigma against 
reporting crimes. “Culturally, some advocates said, Indians, fearing humiliation, are 
often reluctant to press a complaint, seeing it as a test of faith or preferring to ‘let the 
creator take care of it,’ as one said.” Id.  
 162 See Washburn, supra note 107, at 730-31.  
 163 See id.  
 164 Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2809(b) (2008). In 
addition, federal prosecutors are not required to “transfer or disclose any confidential 
or privileged communication, information, or sources to the officials of any Indian tribe. 
Federal agencies authorized to make reports pursuant to this section shall, by 
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2. Lack of Resources in Indian Country  
Many of the practical problems involved with the 
administration of criminal justice in Indian country may be 
attributed to a lack of adequate resources.165 From a policing 
standpoint, typical departments are considerably 
underfunded.166 This lack of financial assistance has resulted in 
a shortage of officers, paucity of twenty-four hour patrolling 
capabilities, outdated equipment and facilities, and reliance on 
a limited operating budget.167 In addition, these problems are 
exacerbated by the vastness of tribal lands compared to the 
relatively small resident populations.168 For example, the 
tribally operated San Carlos Tribal Police Department in 
Arizona employs twenty-five full-time sworn personnel, and 
polices a population of 10,834 living on a 2911 square mile 
reservation.169 This equates to an assignment of only two full-
time sworn officers for every 1000 residents, and only one full-
time sworn officer for every 100 square miles.170  
However, these ratios alone may not explain the full 
extent of the policing problem, nor the resources required.171 
The Department of Justice, in a 2001 report to the National 
Institute of Justice, explained that statistics based on ratios of 
police for a given population and area must be adjusted to 
reflect the level of crime in that location.172 Thus, areas of low 
crime may only require one or two officers for every 1000 
  
regulations, adopt standards for the protection of such communications, information, or 
sources.” 25 U.S.C. § 2809(d).  
 165 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(4), (6), 
(14), (21) (2008); Hart & Lowther, supra note 111, at 210. 
 166 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at vii (noting that “tribes have between 55 
and 75 percent of the resource base available to non-Indian communities”); see also 
Hart & Lowther, supra note 111, at 210. 
 167 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at 9-10; see also Hart & Lowther, supra 
note 111, at 210-11.  
 168 Hart & Lowther, supra note 111, at 210-11. 
 169 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 197936, 
TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/tle00.pdf. At 2911 square miles, this Indian reservation is larger, in area, 
than the state of Delaware by over 400 square miles. See NationMaster.com, 
Encyclopedia: Delaware, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Delaware (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009).  
 170 See HICKMAN, supra note 169, at 2. This problem in coverage is not limited 
to policing Indian Country. In some districts, the nearest United States Attorney is 
several hundred miles away. See Troy A. Eid, Point: Beyond Oliphant: Strengthening 
Criminal Justice In Indian Country, 54 FED. LAW., Mar-Apr. 2007, at 40, 42. 
 171 See WAKELING, supra note 108, at vii. 
 172 Id. 
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residents, while places of high crime, such as Indian country, 
may require a significantly larger police presence.173  
IV. THE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT OF 2008; ALTERNATIVE 
STATUTORY PROPOSALS 
In order to combat overwhelming levels of crime in 
Indian country, Senator Byron Dorgan introduced the Tribal 
Law and Order Act of 2008, which aims to boost policing 
efforts, develop more comprehensive systems of communication 
and data collection, and raise prosecutorial accountability 
standards.174  
A. Declination Reports; Taking Steps to Foster 
Prosecutorial Accountability 
The first problem that the Bill attempts to remedy is the 
high percentage of criminal cases declined by United States 
Attorneys every year.175 Section 102 of the Bill proposes that 
enforcement officials and United States Attorneys submit 
  
 173 Id. Wakeling explains how police-to-citizen ratios may vary: 
The appropriate police coverage (police officers per thousand residents) 
comparison may not be between Indian departments and departments 
serving communities of similar size, but between Indian departments and 
communities with similar crime problems. Given that the violent crime rate 
in Indian Country is between double and triple the national average 
comparable communities would be large urban areas with high violent crime 
rates. For example, Baltimore, Detroit, New York City, and Washington, 
D.C., feature high police-to-citizen ratios, from 3.9 to 6.6 officers per 
thousand residents. Few, if any, departments in Indian Country have ratios 
of more than 2 officers per thousand residents.  
Id. (citations omitted). Academics also attribute the “lack of enthusiasm” by federal law 
enforcement agencies and prosecutors as a leading cause of high crime rates within 
Indian country. See Washburn, supra note 107, at 714. According to N. Bruce Duthu, a 
professor of Native American studies at Dartmouth and published author in the field of 
Indian law, this situation presents a problem based on prosecutorial declinations for 
rape cases. N. Bruce Duthu, Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 
2008, at A17 (“[L]aw enforcement in sexual violence cases in Indian country is 
haphazard at best, recent studies show, and it rarely leads to prosecution and 
conviction of non-Indian offenders . . . . The Department of Justice’s own records show 
that in 2006, prosecutors filed only 606 criminal cases in all of Indian country. With 
more than 560 federally recognized tribes, that works out to a little more than one 
criminal prosecution for each tribe.”). 
 174 Press Release, Byron L. Dorgan, U.S. Senator for N.D., Dorgan Introduces 
Legislation Aimed At Giving Boost To Law & Order In Indian Country (July 23, 2008), 
available at http://dorgan.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=301170. See generally 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2008). 
 175 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 102, 2(a)(10) (2008). 
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detailed reports to both tribal justice officials176 and the Office of 
Indian County Crime177 when a case is declined or terminated.178 
These declination reports must include the type of crime 
alleged, the ethnicity of the victim and the accused 
(Indian/non-Indian), and the reasons for declining the 
investigation or prosecution.179 United States Attorneys who 
decline cases are also required to communicate with tribal 
officials, in a timely fashion to avoid running a tribal statute of 
limitations, the details of a declined case to allow for tribal 
prosecution in tribal court.180 Lastly, under the Bill, the Director 
of the newly created Office of Indian Country Crime is 
responsible for collecting information on these declination 
reports and submitting an annual report to Congress.181 
This section is particularly effective in two ways. First, 
the mandatory coordination between United States Attorneys 
and Tribal officials occurring after federal cases are declined 
greatly increases the chances that tribal prosecutors will be 
able to subsequently bring a successful case in tribal court.182 
The requirement of timely coordination between federal and 
tribal officials also significantly diminishes the likelihood that 
cases will be brought after the statute of limitations has run.183 
In cases involving serious offenses, delays in prosecution can 
result in grave consequences.184 Increased communication under 
  
 176 A “tribal justice official” is a defined term in the Bill meaning either a 
tribal prosecutor, tribal law enforcement officer, or any other person responsible for 
investigating or prosecuting an alleged criminal offense in tribal court. Id. § 3(b)(10). 
 177 The Office of Indian Country Crime would be a new criminal division of the 
Department of Justice. See id. § 12.  
 178 See id. § 102. The Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act of 1990 previously 
“authorized” law enforcement officials or United States Attorneys to submit declination 
reports, but did not require them to do so nor did it establish any standards as to what 
information should be included in such reports. Indian Law Enforcement Act of 1990, 
25 U.S.C. § 2809 (1990).  
 179 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 102(a)(1) (2008). 
In addition, the declination report may include a case file, “including evidence collected 
and statements taken that could support an investigation or prosecution by the 
appropriate tribal justice officials.” Id. § 102(c).  
 180 Id. § 102(a)(2).  
 181 Id. § 102(b). 
 182 Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Country: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 42-43 (2008) [hereinafter 
Federal Declinations Hearing] (statement of M. Brent Leonard, Deputy Att’y Gen. for 
the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation). 
 183 Id. at 43. 
 184 For example, on Montana’s Crow reservation, in the case of the alleged 
rape of a 6-year-old girl by a family member, the FBI had taken up an investigation 
that lasted over three years. When a tribal prosecutor eventually tried to bring the case 
to tribal court, he was unable to move forward due to the FBI’s delay, which had 
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Section 102 of the Bill also requires that United States 
Attorney’s share case details, work-product, and evidence with 
tribal justice officials.185 This coordination is essential to ensure 
that tribal prosecutors are able to bring the most effective 
prosecution in a case that has been declined by a United States 
Attorney.186 
Second, the mandatory submission of declination 
reports to tribal justice officials and the Office of Indian 
Country Crime expands the collection of data and flow of 
information between various law enforcement agencies, greatly 
increasing the accountability of United States Attorneys.187 
Ideally, these reports will identify the reasons why cases are 
being declined and prompt a more efficient allocation of 
resources.188 However, Indian tribes might benefit if several 
changes were made to Section 102. 
With regard to the declination reports, it would be 
advantageous if each case were at least referred to a federal 
prosecutor for evaluation on the merits.189 By doing so, officers 
would gain legal insight that would be used to combat crime in 
Indian country more efficiently.190 In addition, the Bill does not 
explicitly take into consideration the confidential nature of 
these declination reports and their potential discoverability in 
  
caused the tribal statute of limitations to run. See Riley, supra note 16; Federal 
Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 43 (statement of M. Brent Leonard).  
 185 Id.; see Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 102:  
Section 10 of the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act [] is amended by 
striking subsections (a) through (d) and inserting the following: . . . (2) 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS . . . the United States Attorney shall—(A) 
coordinate and communicate with the appropriate tribal justice official, 
sufficiently in advance of the tribal statute of limitations, reasonable details 
regarding the case to permit the tribal prosecutor to pursue the case in tribal 
court . . . (c) Inclusion of Case Files—A report submitted to the appropriate 
tribal justice officials . . . may include the case file, including evidence 
collected and statements taken that could support an investigation or 
prosecution by the appropriate tribal justice officials. 
Id.  
 186 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 43 (statement of M. 
Brent Leonard).  
 187 Id. at 37, 39 (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger, Partner, Best and 
Flanagan, LLP). 
 188 See id. at 35-36. 
 189 This and the subsequent proposals were discussed in a number of 
testimonies made during the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs hearing on the Tribal 
Law and Order Act on September 18, 2008. See id. at 35. 
 190 Id. at 9 (statement of Drew H. Wrigley, U.S. Att’y for the District of North 
Dakota). 
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subsequent criminal cases.191 By making declination reports 
available to the public, not only would private information 
regarding victims and witnesses be available to the sometimes 
very small Indian communities, but the reasons for declining a 
case against a particular defendant may be used against the 
prosecution in subsequent cases involving the same 
defendant.192 In order to avoid these potential problems, Section 
102 should be amended to make all declination reports 
confidential, and include an indemnification clause to prohibit 
federal officials’ civil liability based on the information 
contained in these reports.193 
Even though declination reports would likely provide a 
wealth of information that could be used in the future to 
improve criminal justice in Indian country, some worry that 
these reports may be misconstrued if taken out of context, 
suggesting that United States Attorneys are not working hard 
enough.194 In reality, there are many reasons why a case may be 
  
 191 Id. at 36 (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger); id. at 9 (statement of Drew 
H. Wrigley). 
 192 Id. at 9-10. Drew Wrigley, the United States Attorney for the District of 
North Dakota, testified as to a case out of the District of South Dakota that was 
compromised due to the discovery of a declination letter. According to Mr. Wrigley, the 
District of South Dakota declined to prosecute a case based on “weak or insufficient 
admissible evidence and a potential witness problem.” Id. at 9. In a subsequent case 
involving the same accused individual, the victim from the declined case was called as 
a witness and the defense entered the declination letter into evidence. During 
summation, the defense attorney suggested that the witness’s testimony was not 
credible based on the reasons stated in the previous case’s declination letter. Mr. 
Wrigley did not state the ultimate outcome of the case in his example. See id. 
 193 See id. at 36 (testimony of Thomas B. Heffelfinger). In terms of 
confidentiality, while such an amendment would prevent public disclosure, there is no 
explicit requirement that declination reports be made publicly available. To the 
contrary, under Section 102, declination reports are only required to be sent to the 
Office of Indian Country Crime (a proposed division of the Department of Justice), a 
tribal justice official, and as an annual report to Congress. While tribal justice officials 
may disclose these reports to a tribe, there is no requirement that they do so. See 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008); see Federal 
Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 42 (testimony of M. Brent Leonard). In 
addition, under the Freedom of Information Act, declination reports may be exempt 
from public disclosure if “compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [and if they] could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7)(A) (2006); see Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 42 
(testimony of M. Brent Leonard). Lastly, the annual submission of declination reports 
to Congress does not waive any disclosure exemptions under the Freedom of 
Information Act. See Kanter v. Internal Revenue Service, 433 F. Supp. 812, 825 n.22 
(N.D. Ill. 1977).  
 194 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 37 (testimony of 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger). In his testimony in front of the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs, former United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota Thomas B. 
Heffelfinger described how misconceptions regarding declination rates in Indian 
Country could not be farther from the truth:  
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declined irrespective of individual job performance. The most 
common of these reasons being that there is insufficient 
evidence to prosecute.195 In light of this misconception, it is 
important to next look at how the Bill addresses the problems 
that law enforcement officials have with obtaining sufficient 
evidence to prosecute a criminal case in Indian country.  
B.  Insufficient Evidence to Prosecute; Fixing Investigative 
and Policing Systems 
Declining a case for a lack of sufficient evidence stems 
from problems with the infrastructure or the implementation of 
policing systems in Indian country.196 One way the Bill attempts 
to remedy these problems is by improving the overall 
communication between federal and tribal officials.197 Section 
  
I am concerned that the requirement for declination reports could create the 
incorrect implication that declinations in the United States Attorneys’ Offices 
are due to a lack of commitment and effort by federal law enforcement and 
prosecutors working in Indian Country. In reality, federal agents and 
prosecutors who address crimes in Indian Country are among the most 
dedicated and hard-working prosecutors and agents in the federal law 
enforcement system. These men and women work under difficult conditions 
with extremely large case loads and deal with some of the most emotionally-
charged cases that federal prosecutors and agents can face. It is my 
experience, based upon approximately 13 years as a federal prosecutor, that 
cases are not declined because the agents and the Assistant United States 
Attorneys lack commitment to justice in Indian Country. 
Id.  
 195 Id. While the most common reason that cases are declined is due to a lack 
of sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a violation of the law, there 
are a number of other reasons that have no relation to a prosecutor’s job performance. 
These reasons include jurisdictional barriers, limited resources, and a lack of 
confidence in obtaining a conviction. See id. at 37-38 (testimony of Thomas B. 
Heffelfinger); id. at 42 (testimony of M. Brent Leonard); see also Broken Justice, supra 
note 1 (“You gotta look at what is actually brought to the prosecutor in terms of a case 
that provides a viable prosecution. We, ethically, can’t do anything that is not brought 
to us that establishes probable cause in a court. So, if we don’t get a quality 
investigation, you know we’re not gonna be able to do anything.”). 
 196 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 37-39 (testimony of 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger). 
 197 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. §§ 104, 303 
(2008). Section 101 of the Bill adds to the list of duties of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
Division of Law Enforcement Services: 
(10) communicating with tribal leaders, tribal community advocates, tribal 
justice officials, and residents of Indian land on a regular basis regarding 
public safety and justice concerns facing tribal communities; (11) conducting 
meaningful and timely consultation with tribal leaders and tribal justice 
officials in the development of regulatory policies and other actions that 
affect public safety and justice in Indian country. 
See id. § 101. 
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104 of the Bill expands the duties of the Office of Tribal Justice, 
deeming it the chief “point of contact” for tribal/federal 
correspondence regarding “public safety and justice” in Indian 
country.198 In addition, Section 303 allows Indian law 
enforcement agencies to “directly access” national criminal 
information databases.199 
The Bill also increases investigative efforts in Indian 
country by empowering tribal law enforcement agencies.200 One 
way the Bill does this is by permitting tribal law enforcement 
officials to obtain training at available state and local police 
academies, so long as those training facilities meet the 
standards established by the Secretary of the Interior.201 
Another way the Bill empowers tribal officials is by 
encouraging the use of cooperative teams of federal, state, and 
tribal officials to work together in the policing of Indian 
country.202 In order to promote cooperation between the various 
agencies, the Bill offers incentives such as federal grants, 
technical assistance, and regional training.203 This team-based 
method of policing will likely reduce investigative delays204 and 
increase law enforcement enthusiasm by including officials 
  
 198 See id. § 104. The Office of Tribal Justice exists as part of the Department 
of Justice and serves as the “primary channel of communication for Native Americans 
with the Department of Justice.” See Office of Tribal Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The Tribal Law and Order Act would make this office a 
“permanent division of the Department” by providing “such personnel and funds as are 
necessary.” See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 104(a) (2008). 
Further, the Bill provides that the Office of Tribal Justice coordinate with federal 
agencies within the Department of Justice to oversee that tribal leaders have a role in 
developing law enforcement policies. See id. 
 199 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 303 (2008). 
 200 Id. §§ 301-305. 
 201 Id. § 301(a). 
 202 The Bill includes three main sources of these cooperative teams: Under 
Section 202, State, tribal, and local governments are encouraged to enter into 
“Cooperative Assistance Programs,” which relate to “mutual aid, hot pursuit of 
suspects, and cross-deputatization.” See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 
110th Cong. § 202 (2008). Secondly, under Section 301(b), the Secretary of the Interior 
is responsible for overseeing the implementation of “Special Law Enforcement 
Commissions,” which involve federal, state, and tribal officials working together to 
police Indian Country. See id. § 301(b). Lastly, Sections 302(c) and (d) amend the 
Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. § 873) to allow tribal officials to enter into 
cooperative arrangements with state and federal drug enforcement agents. See id. 
§ 302(c)-(d). 
 203 See id. §§ 202, 301. 
 204 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 38 (testimony of 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger) (“Delay is, unfortunately, a frequent factor in Indian Country 
investigations and prosecutions. This delay may be attributable to jurisdictional 
considerations, lack of resources, remote location or difficulties in obtaining witnesses 
or witness cooperation.”). 
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from local tribal communities.205 Similar programs have been 
successfully implemented in areas of rural America to provide 
better policing coverage.206 
These cooperative programs may greatly help to close 
some of the law enforcement gaps in Indian country, but would 
only be effective if utilized extensively.207 Further, the use of 
incentives such as “technical assistance” and federal “grants” to 
encourage these programs do not sufficiently ensure that these 
programs will be implemented.208 If the Bill were able to provide 
for concrete monetary funding commitments, these programs 
would have the resources they need in order to expand the total 
police presence in Indian country.209 As the situation stands 
today, the BIA would have to triple its current working force in 
order to police Indian country with coverage and efficiency 
comparable to other rural communities.210 
  
 205 See WAKELING, supra note 108. When Indian reservations receive 
inadequate federal policing, and tribal governments are legally unable to participate, 
communities are left with poor expectations and low morale. See Riley, supra note 16 
(“Many people on reservations no longer expect justice.”). Thus, by encouraging the use 
of special law enforcement commissions, tribal governments will be able to become 
more involved with federal investigative efforts while simultaneously improving law 
enforcement coverage in Indian Country. Such commissions would be valuable by 
unifying policing efforts instead of promoting separate overlapping agencies like many 
current criminal jurisdictions in Indian Country. 
 206 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 39 (testimony of 
Thomas B. Heffelfinger) (“Cooperative law enforcement services, such as Child 
Advocacy Centers, drug task forces and crime labs . . . can effectively enhance law 
enforcement in both Indian Country and non-Indian Country. Current cooperative 
efforts, such as the FBI’s Safe Trails Task Forces and the Family Advocacy Center of 
Northern Minnesota, have proven the effectiveness of this strategy.”); see supra note 
143. 
 207 These cooperative agreements are similar to the 638 contracts and self-
governance compacts by means of their ability to empower tribal officials. See Eid, 
supra note 170, at 40 (“Ute Mountain has become a haven for all kinds of criminals—
Indian and non-Indian alike—who confront a capable but chronically short-staffed law 
enforcement presence. Only five police officers—all from the U.S. Department of the 
Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) —patrol a reservation about the size of Rhode 
Island. Sometimes just one BIA police officer is available on call, resulting in response 
times of more than one hour.”); supra notes 16-17, 19.  
 208 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 202 (2008). 
 209 See Eid, supra note 170, at 42 (“According to the consultant’s estimate, BIA 
had a 69 percent unmet staffing need for law enforcement officers and a 61 percent 
unmet need for correctional facilities and programs. In addition, the report concluded 
that tribes should hire 1,059 new law enforcement officers, based on a staffing gap of 
33 percent in that category, and 341 correctional officers based on a 24 percent staffing 
gap.”). 
 210 See id. at 42 (“The consultant’s report recommended that the BIA hire 
1,097 new employees to achieve parity in criminal justice and corrections programs. By 
comparison, the BIA’s Office of Justice Services currently has about 450 total 
employees on its payroll.”). 
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C.  Fundamental Problems Not Addressed by the Bill; 
Solutions for the Future 
Notwithstanding the positive changes to Indian law, the 
Bill does not address some of the more fundamental problems 
with law enforcement in Indian country. For instance, the Bill 
does not address the fact that the FBI is simply not geared to 
deal with “reactive” cases.211 Reactive cases, such as rape, 
domestic violence, and assault, require an actively patrolling 
police network “on the ground” because of the problems 
associated with investigative delay.212 While the Bill 
successfully expands the powers of tribal and BIA police,213 it 
does not attempt to unite these groups with the FBI or other 
law enforcement agencies dealing with Major Crimes in Indian 
country.214 Unifying law enforcement and prosecution would 
  
 211 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 53 (statement of 
Thomas W. Weissmuller, Chief Judge, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation); 
Washburn, supra note 107, at 718; supra Part III.A.3; supra note 129 and 
accompanying text. 
 212 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 53 (testimony of 
Thomas W. Weissmuller); supra Parts III.A.3, III.B.2. For most major crimes 
committed within Indian Country, a case changes hand several times. A case report 
may travel from the initial hands of tribal or Bureau of Indian Affairs police officers, to 
those officers’ supervisors, who refer the case to tribal prosecutors. If that case is a 
Major Crime, it is referred to federal investigators such as the FBI. After FBI officials 
conduct their own investigations, they may meet with Assistant United States 
Attorney Indian Law Liaisons to refer the matter to a number of other criminal 
divisions within the Department of Justice, such as the Organized Crime and 
Racketeering Division or Child Exploitation and Obscenity division. This entire 
exchange of information is done before the case reaches the hands of a United States 
Attorney for prosecution, assuming there is enough evidence to prosecute in the first 
place. Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 53 (testimony of Thomas W. 
Weissmuller). According to Thomas W. Weissmuller, Chief Judge of the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Nation, “[t]his system is not designed to handle reactive cases.” Id.; see 
also id. at 11 (testimony of Drew H. Wrigley). 
 213 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. §§ 301-305 (2008). 
 214 Under the current arrangement between the BIA and the FBI, the FBI 
handles Major Crimes while the BIA handles less serious crimes. See Washburn, supra 
note 107, at 719-20; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text. Instead of 
consolidating the various law enforcement agencies, the Bill mandates the use of 
additional levels of bureaucracy, such as Assistant United States Attorney Tribal 
Liaisons. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 103(b) (2008). 
These Tribal Liaisons would serve as a communication link between tribal leaders and 
United States Attorneys in a given district and coordinate federal prosecutions of 
Indian Country crime. Id. While Tribal Liaisons are an important means to bridge the 
gap in communication between United States Attorneys and tribal leaders, the Bill 
does not address the reasons why this gap exists in the first place. Further, in districts 
where the United States Attorney interacts with tribal leaders on a regular basis, this 
communication gap does not exist. Rather, a trust relationship is formed between 
federal prosecutors and tribal officials. Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, 
at 48 (statement of Janelle F. Doughty, Director, Department of Justice and 
Regulatory, Southern Ute Tribe) (“It is my belief that actual personal interaction is 
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effectively streamline Indian country policing efforts and 
reduce complications associated with delay.215 Under the 
current dual system of investigation, federal investigators often 
become involved after tribal and BIA police conduct 
preliminary investigations.216 Due to this overlap in law 
enforcement duties, FBI agents may commence their 
investigation after outdoor evidence is destroyed, memories 
faded, and some witnesses became unavailable or 
uncooperative, thus jeopardizing the success of a given case.217 
Therefore, in order to alleviate the difficulties associated with 
the current divide in law enforcement duties, the Bill should 
unify efforts in Indian country so that resources are used more 
efficiently and all officers are prepared to deal with the unique 
challenges of policing Indian country.218 
Another area of Indian law that the Bill fails to 
adequately address is tribes’ inability to effectively punish 
those who commit crimes within Indian country.219 In terms of 
  
irreplaceable in developing strong working relationships. With isolation from the 
prosecutorial system, we drastically limit common understanding.”); see id. at 53 
(testimony of Thomas W. Weissmuller).  
 215 See generally Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 50-55 
(testimony of Thomas W. Weissmuller). In cases of rape or domestic abuse, these 
complications from delay can be devastating. For example, in under-funded tribal 
jurisdictions, while a Major Crimes case is in the process of changing hands between 
federal law enforcement officials, the alleged perpetrator may remain free until federal 
charges are brought and an arrest is made. In cases involving domestic violence or 
child abuse, this may result in an abusive parent continuing to live in the same home 
as the victim. See id. at 52 (testimony of Thomas W. Weissmuller). Michael Riley, a 
reporter for the Denver Post, describes how the divided system of law enforcement 
affects federal prosecutions: 
It’s a triage situation where the FBI has a certain amount of resources, so 
they depend on the tribal police investigators to do a lot of the investigation, 
which creates some problems because the tribal investigators are not as well 
trained, often make mistakes. They can contaminate evidence. It creates a 
problem for the U. S. attorneys, who will complain that many of the cases 
they receive simply are poorly investigated and part of it has to do with that 
combination between the duties of tribal police and the FBI and how those 
are split. 
See Broken Justice, supra note 1. 
 216 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 53 (testimony of 
Thomas W. Weissmuller) (“When a case dove-tails into two jurisdictions, efforts are 
frequently duplicated and the several levels of discretion are revisited.”); id. at 8-9 
(testimony of Drew H. Wrigley). 
 217 Id. (testimony of Drew H. Wrigley); see also Washburn, supra note 107, at 
719-20; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 218 See supra notes 135-145, 165-175 and accompanying text.  
 219 This specifically refers to the inability of tribal governments to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and the inability of tribal courts to punish any 
criminals with a sentence of over 1 year in jail or a $5000 fine. See Christopher B. 
Chaney, Overcoming Legal Hurdles in the War Against Meth in Indian Country, 82 
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the sentencing authority of tribal courts, the Bill does amend 
the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to increase maximum 
sentencing limits from one year to three years and increase 
maximum fines from $5000 to $15,000.220 However, while this 
increase in sentencing authority is commendable, it would 
serve tribes better if they were permitted to punish criminals 
at comparable levels to state or federal jurisdictions.221  
The primary reason for increasing tribal sentencing 
authority is that the current one-year limit is grossly 
inadequate when compared to the average sentencing limits for 
states’ lowest level felonies, let alone more serious crimes such 
as rape and murder.222 For example, in one tribal case in which 
the federal statute of limitations had run (presumably from 
delay), an Indian man was successfully convicted in tribal court 
for drugging and raping a thirteen-year old girl.223 Even though 
the trial was conducted in accordance with the procedural 
standards imposed in federal court,224 the defendant was 
sentenced to only one year imprisonment and fined $5000, the 
statutory maximum under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
  
N.D. L. REV. 1151, 1158-1164 (2006) (“There are two types of legal hurdles to effective 
law enforcement in Indian country. The first is the ban on tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians as set forth in the antiquated Oliphant decision. The second hurdle is 
the sentencing restrictions imposed on tribal courts by the Indian Civil Rights Act.”); 
supra notes 90, 94. 
 220 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 304 (2008). 
The three-year maximum sentencing authority was initially chosen based on the fact 
that assault was the most common federally prosecuted crime, and the most common 
sentence was 34 months. See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 45 
(testimony of M. Brent Leonhard). 
 221 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 44-45.  
 222 See id. (“[A]ccording to a memo previously submitted into the Senate 
record by [M. Brent Leonhard] and Cisco Minthorn, of the states that define felonies, 
the majority define their lowest level felony as having a maximum sentence of 5 
years.”). This notion is particularly upsetting given that Indians lay victim to violent 
crime at more than twice the rate of other racial groups and declination rates in Indian 
Country are at 65%. See AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 5; see also 
Broken Justice, supra note 1.  
 223 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 52 (testimony of 
Thomas W. Weissmuller). The offender in this case was in his late twenties. After the 
girl was reportedly missing, two family members went searching for her. They found 
her unconscious in a bedroom of a friend’s house, “laid over a pile of blankets, face 
down so her bottom was elevated.” A “team of cross-commissioned law enforcement 
officers” investigated the scene using a forensic “rape kit” to collect samples from the 
victim and offender’s bodies. Id. 
 224 Id. (“The trial was managed pursuant to the federal rules of evidence and 
the tribal rules of procedure, which basically mirrored the federal rules. All witnesses 
were cross examined by defense counsel and the defense called supporting witnesses.”).  
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1968.225 A lack of adequate tribal sentencing authority in 
situations such as these is unacceptable.226 If tribal 
governments were able to punish criminals with reasonable 
sentences instead of the current one-year limit imposed by the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, communities would be able to 
take better charge of their own criminal prosecutions, thus 
boosting overall confidence in tribal justice.227 
The Bill also fails to address the inability of tribes to 
punish non-Indian offenders, as opined by the Court in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.228 Allowing tribal 
governments to prosecute non-Indian offenders would close a 
jurisdictional loophole that has attracted non-Indian criminals 
to tribal lands.229 One area of crime where this gap in 
jurisdiction has been greatly exploited in recent decades is in 
drug trafficking, specifically in methamphetamine.230 However, 
the consequences of prohibiting tribal governments from 
exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders 
  
 225 Id. Had the matter been adjudicated in federal court, “the defendant might 
have received 18 years.” Id.; see Indian Civil Rights Act, PUB. L. NO. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 
(1968) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1986)). 
 226 See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 52 (testimony of 
Thomas W. Weissmuller). In the current example, the offender only ended up serving 
nine months out of the one year sentence due to overcrowding in local prisons. Id. Also 
consider that for some offenses, such as those involving drug or alcohol abuse, longer 
sentences are primarily meant to rehabilitate an offender. See Chaney, supra note 219, 
at 1162-63. For example, in cases of convicted methamphetamine addicts, treatments 
usually require several months for placement and over a year of treatment to be 
effective. Thus, offenders’ sentences tend to expire before treatment is completed. Id. 
This problem is exacerbated by the unusually high prevalence of drug and alcohol 
abuse among offenders and recidivism in Indian Country. See AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
CRIME, supra note 10, at 10, 22-24. 
 227 It is important to note that the current system divides misdemeanor and 
felony prosecution between tribal and federal officials not by the Major Crimes Act, but 
by the practicality of prosecuting felonies through tribal courts with sentencing limits 
of only one year. The Major Crimes Act simply gives the United States concurrent 
jurisdiction over most felonies committed on federal lands, including Indian Country. 
See supra Part II.C; see also Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995); Eid, 
supra note 170, at 42-44. 
 228 See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 229 See Eid, supra note 170, at 46. Due to this jurisdictional loophole and other 
problems with law tribal law enforcement, Indian reservations have come to be known 
as, “lawless lands.” See Riley, supra note 16; Michael Riley, Principles, Politics Collide, 
DENVER POST, Nov. 13, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ 
lawlesslands/ci_7446439 (“Tribal police in Nevada, eastern Michigan and elsewhere 
complain that federal prosecutors consistently decline cases of employees who embezzle 
from tribal casinos, in some instances stealing tens of thousands of dollars. Because 
those employees often are non-Indian, they are beyond the jurisdiction of tribal courts, 
making the crime virtually risk free.”).  
 230 See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1151 (“Methamphetamine is ‘public enemy 
number one’ for many tribes within the United States.”). 
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stretch beyond merely creating a jurisdictional safe haven for 
drug traffickers.231 Non-Indian methamphetamine dealers have 
actually developed tribal “business plans” by producing drugs 
on Indian lands and subsequently targeting the tribes’ native 
population for clientele.232  
Methamphetamine addiction in Indian country has 
resulted in horrific consequences to the welfare of tribal 
populations.233 Aside from the well-known health problems 
associated with methamphetamine addiction,234 those addicted 
are also more likely to commit violent crimes such as assault, 
child abuse, and domestic violence.235 One way that the Bill 
deals with these substance abuse problems is by expanding the 
use of educational programs for tribal youth and rehabilitation 
programs for drug abusers.236 While these programs will likely 
  
 231 Id. at 1152; see also The Problem of Methamphetamine in Indian Country: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 97-98 (2006) (statement of 
Kathleen W. Kitcheyan, San Carlos Apache Chairwoman).  
 232 See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1156 (internal citation omitted). This 
“business plan” has become popular for two chief reasons: First, drug dealers have the 
perception that Indian Country is indeed a “lawless land” where they can conduct 
illegal activities with little worry. Second, Indians are known as having alcohol and 
drug addictions, making them a vulnerable population for methamphetamine dealers. 
These two factors make Indian Country a prime target for drug traffickers. Id. at 1155-
56 (“Native Americans have the highest rate of methamphetamine abuse of any 
ethnicity in the United States.”); see Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th 
Cong. § 2(a)(17) (2008) (“[T]he Department of Justice has reported that drug 
organizations have increasingly targeted Indian country to produce and distribute 
methamphetamine, citing the limited law enforcement presence and jurisdictional 
confusion as reasons for the increased activity . . . .”). 
 233 See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1164 (“The impact of methamphetamine is 
devastating and has an unacceptably high cost on lives, families, and tribal cultures.”). 
 234 See DEA Factsheet, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/ 
methfact02.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). Methamphetamine has been associated 
with a large number of health dangers including increased heart rate, blood pressure, 
body temperature, and rate of breathing. Methamphetamine may also cause brain 
damage, paranoia, and psychosis like that found in schizophrenics. These psychological 
symptoms may result in hallucinations and self-mutilation. Further, the withdrawal 
process usually is accompanied by severe depression. Id.; see Chaney, supra note 219, 
at 1152 (“Recent testimony before the United States Senate Indian Affairs Committee 
noted that on the San Carlos Apache reservation, twenty-five percent of babies born on 
the reservation were born addicted to methamphetamine.”). 
 235 See DEA Factsheet, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/ 
methfact01.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009) (“There is a direct relationship between 
methamphetamine abuse and increased incidents of domestic violence and child 
abuse.”); Chaney, supra note 219, at 1154. 
 236 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 401(a)(2)(E) 
(2008) (extending grants for tribal action substance abuse plans through 2013); see also 
id. § 401(b)(a)(1) (creating pilot programs to educate youth on the dangers of alcohol 
and substance abuse); id. § 401(c) (increasing funding for emergency shelters and half-
way houses for youth substance abusers who have been arrested for drug or alcohol 
abuse related offenses); id. § 401(g) (extending funding for juvenile detention centers). 
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provide much needed assistance for tribal members seeking 
help and hopefully reduce tribal demand for 
methamphetamine, tribal governments are still left without 
the legal authority to confront the suppliers of these drugs 
themselves.237  
Non-Indian participation in crimes involving Indian 
victims is not limited to trafficking methamphetamine.238 This 
problem is most pronounced in cases of rape and sexual 
assault, where eighty-six percent of offenders are non-Indian.239 
This statistic is particularly unsettling given that sexual 
violence committed against Indian women has reached 
disturbing levels.240 According to the Department of Justice, one 
in three Indian women will be raped in her lifetime, most likely 
by a complete stranger, as opposed to an intimate partner, 
family member, or acquaintance.241 Due to the gravity of the 
problems associated with non-Indian crime in Indian country, 
it is unclear why this Bill does not propose expanding tribes’ 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.242  
The Supreme Court in Oliphant noted that one reason 
for this limitation in criminal jurisdiction was to protect the 
constitutional civil liberties of non-Indians in tribal court.243 
However, since the Oliphant decision in 1978, many tribal 
governments have advanced their justice systems, protecting 
constitutional rights such as ensuring due process and 
  
 237 See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1155-60 (noting the success of drug 
prevention and rehabilitation programs in reducing methamphetamine demand while 
simultaneously addressing the legal hurdles to confronting non-Indian offenders). 
 238 See AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 10, at 8-9. 
 239 See id. at 9. This trend can be seen across all crimes involving Indian 
victims. Indian victims of violent crime reported that 66% of offenders were non-
Indian. Id.  
 240 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(13)(A) 
(2008); see also Amnesty International, USA: Authorities Fail to Protect Indigenous 
Women From Shocking Rates of Rape, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/ 
info/AMR51/071/2007 (follow “PDF” link) (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).  
 241 See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(13)(B) 
(2008). In addition, approximately two out of five Indian women will be subject to 
domestic violence. Id. § 2(a)(13)(C); see also AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, supra note 
10, at 8; N. Bruce Duthu, Opinion, Broken Justice in Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
10, 2008, at A17. 
 242 This notion is also odd considering that the Bill addresses the lack of tribes 
to prosecute non-Indians in its “Findings” section. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 
2008, S. 3320, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(9) (2008); see supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 243 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978) (“The 
power of the United States to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation 
of the power to restrict personal liberty.”); see also Eid, supra note 170, at 45-46. 
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providing an unbiased jury pool.244 Thus, Congress should 
permit tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians, so long as tribal courts are held to the same 
procedural standards as federal courts.245 By repealing 
Oliphant, Congress would effectively close the jurisdictional 
loophole that has enticed non-Indian criminals to tribal lands, 
while simultaneously granting tribal governments the judicial 
independence necessary to take command over the problems 
caused by drug trafficking and violent crime.246 
V. CONCLUSION 
If violent crime occurred in any other community at the 
levels at which it occurs on Indian reservations, it would be 
reasonable to expect a local anti-crime movement or increased 
enrollment in the local police academy. However, when the 
power to take responsibility for the problems within a 
community is severely weakened by federal laws that are as 
  
 244 Eid, supra note 170, at 45-46 (“Building on President Richard M. Nixon’s 
Indian self-determination policy, many tribal governments are undergoing what has 
been compared to a renaissance, gaining substantially increased governmental 
sophistication and economic development.”); See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1158-59 
(“Navajo Nation law used to only allow Navajo tribal members to sit on tribal court 
juries. In Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court adopted the 
‘fair cross section of the community’ concept. In addition, the Navajo Nation Code has 
been amended to no longer require tribal membership as a juror qualification. In fact, 
today . . . many tribal courts offer criminal defendants greater rights than the federal 
Indian Civil Rights Act requires.”). On some reservations, the United States already 
uses tribal facilities as federal detention centers. These detention centers operate 
under the supervision of federal government, thus preserving criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights. See Federal Declinations Hearings, supra note 182, at 49 
(testimony of Janelle F. Doughty) (“I strongly support a repeal of Oliphant as a 
common-sense way to strengthen public safety on our reservation.”); see id. at 50-55 
(testimony of Thomas W. Weissmuller).  
 245 See Eid, supra note 170, at 42 (discussing the importance of guaranteeing 
constitutional due process protections by providing a “full and fair forum by an 
independent, neutral arbiter”).  
 246 See Chaney, supra note 219, at 1164 (“Congress has the power to make 
tribal communities safer by crafting permanent and appropriate updates to remove 
these unnecessary and dangerous legal hurdles. By making these adjustments, 
Congress would improve public safety to all Americans who live, work, travel, or 
recreate within or near Indian country.”); See Eid, supra note 170, at 45-46 (indicating 
that if non-Indians were subject to criminal proceedings in tribal court, they would 
have a far greater stake in the future development of Indian country). If Congress is 
not ready for such a drastic change, perhaps it may consider granting tribes the ability 
to practice criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the same way that tribes have 
been granted the ability to police non-Indians through “638 contracts” or “self-
governance compacts.” Agreements such as these would effectively increase criminal 
prosecution of non-Indians within Indian country while maintaining congressionally 
imposed standards for criminal procedure. See Guedel, supra note 10 (noting the 
anachronistic nature of the Oliphant decision).  
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defective as they are antiquated, communities are left feeling 
hopeless and understandably frustrated. The problems on 
Indian reservations are not in any regards minor, but they 
often involve avoidable violent crimes. These crimes destroy 
lives and tear apart tribal communities. Thus, it is greatly 
encouraging when a bill like the Tribal Law and Order Act 
attempts to make real changes to the status quo by enhancing 
overall coordination between the various law enforcement 
agencies, demanding greater accountability from federal 
prosecutors, and investing in a number of tribal programs 
aimed at educating and rehabilitating affected Indian 
populations. Notwithstanding these positive proposals, the Bill 
nevertheless treats the symptoms of crime in Indian country 
when it should be targeting the disease. Increasing overall 
funding to the current system may very well solve these 
problems. But when this is not an option, perhaps it is time to 
reassess some of the legal barriers to empowering tribal 
governments to take charge of their own destiny. Dated legal 
models such as the “federal trust responsibility” and “dual 
sovereignty” may work well in theory, but there is no doubt 
that the arrangement that tribes have had with the United 
States over the past 200 years has not worked well in practice. 
By making the fundamental changes to Indian law that this 
Note suggests, tribal governments will be able to challenge 
traditional ways of fighting crime and hopefully embrace a 
safer and more optimistic future. 
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